One-thousand, three-hundred and eighty-one days after the initial invasion, Iraq’s deposed tyrant stood in an ill-lit room of cinder block walls. Masked men fitted a noose around a now-powerless mass murderer’s neck. Before Saddam Hussein was dropped to his death, some of the faceless men in the room muttered ominously, “Muqtada… Muqtada…”

Hussein replied in a mocking tone, with a half smile, “…Muqtada?”

A short interchange later, the switch was pulled. The floor gave way, and the tyrant was dead.

Muqtada al-Sadr organized an autonomous network of radical militiamen that was almost completely decentralized and delegated responsibility to its devout Shia followers and hardcore militia members independently of its leader. The organization posed a massive threat to American and Coalition forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2007 while instigating sectarian violence and instigated near anarchy and civil war. An examination of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army, as in the following paper, will provide invaluable lessons in future conflicts across the globe.

Lesson One: How did the Mahdi Army finance and arm itself?

The Mahdi Army, the radical militia wing of Muqtada al-Sadr’s organization, was financed in several distinct ways. First, Muqtada’s followers were independently responsible for acquiring their own weapons, which were usually paid for with their own money.^[1]

Secondly, Muqtada attracted many donations and other contributions that stemmed from religious supporters in a heavily populated but deeply impoverished Shiite area.^[2]

Third, there had been perpetual speculation during the years of conflict with the Mahdi Army — even outright accusations and condemnations from American and Allied officials — that the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran had been either directly or indirectly funding and materially supporting the Muqtada’s Mahdi Army.^[3]

In the aptly-named Sadr City in 2003, Sheikh Qais al-Kaza’ali, a follower of Muqtada al-Sadr, boldly proclaimed on behalf of the quickly-organizing Mahdi Army, “We do not need to issue weapons. Everybody has their own gun.”^[4] The Mahdi Army was self-sufficient and self-financed. Fighters were charged with obtaining their own weapons from the black market or from some of the many unguarded weapons caches throughout the Iraqi countryside.^[5]

Several militia members claimed to have spent between hundreds and thousands dollars to purchase automatic rifles immediately after signing up to serve in the Mahdi Army.^[6] It was assumed that most of the weaponry used against coalition forces including rifles, antitank mines, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were secured from unguarded army bases and munitions dumps immediately after the defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003.

In Basra alone, British troops confiscated eight truckloads of heavy weaponry in one raid.[7]

In another, British forces recovered fifteen tons of weapons and ammunition that had been stolen by Mahdi Army members during the post-invasion looting.^[8] Both stockpiles were discovered no more than two months after the fall of Saddam.^[9]

On rare occasions, Muqtada himself made direct financial contributions to local branches of the Mahdi Army during or after major battles that he morally supports.^[10] These contributions stemmed from a collection of small, but regular donations from avid supporters of Muqtada in the Shiite slums he controls.^[11]

But by in large, Muqtada remained a distant source of leadership and inspiration to his devout followers in the Mahdi Army. Described as an “ideological army,” Mahdi Army members did not earn salaries or any real material bonuses that incentivized their joining and fighting.^[12] Almost all of their fighters originated from destitute Shiite slums. Fighters are extremely driven young men who are vindictive and driven after decades of oppression under the Sunni despot Saddam Hussein.

The Iraqi Shiite population had been rendered devoid of power and any sort of political or social influence for years. As such, the main draw to the Mahdi Army had been the lure of the actual ability to obtain — and willfully exert — power. Fighters operated on pride and obtained “concrete forms of power and prestige: they carry weapons, can impose their will, notwithstanding traditional social barriers, and can impose their moral edicts.”^[13]

Greater stabilization in Iraq in 2008 was largely attributed to the influx or “surge” of American troops stationed in and around the greater Baghdad area. However, one speculated financier of Iraqi militia groups, Iran, had apparently shifted its behavior against backing militias and providing an array of arms and advanced weaponry to them as public awareness of Iranian involvement had grown considerably from 2004 to 2007.^[14]

During that time period, Iranian involvement had been increasingly reported throughout Iraq. As late as 2007, Muqtada admitted that the Mahdi Army had “formal ties” to the Iranian-linked militant organization Hezbollah.^[15] Two Shiite militia groups that broke away from Muqtada al-Sadr’s organization were believed to have been directly financed in their efforts by Iran.^[16]

Much like his fluid and inconsistent style of leadership, Muqtada’s stance toward Iran has shifted numerous times: “Muqtada al-Sadr used to stick to a nationalist line. Now, one could describe his rhetoric as almost pro-Iranian. Even the Mahdi Army has shifted its tone. Last year’s anti-Iranian discourse has given way to something quite different”.^[17]

There is even speculation that Muqtada and high ranking Mahdi Army members have sought refuge in Iran for security reasons in early 2008 as American forces widely secured Iraq.^[18] Speculation aside, it is apparent that Iran defiantly exerted a deadly and meddling hand in Iraq.

The extent of Iranian interference in Iraq remains largely unknown to the public.

Lesson Two: How did Muqtada al-Sadr come to gain control of civil ministries at both the local and national level?

Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr assumed control of area hospitals immediately after the invasion of Iraq.

Looking to establish control of local areas and assert greater social influence, Muqtada primarily sought control of hospitals in order to mimic the Palestinian militant movement Hezbollah, which “prides itself on providing medical and aid services.”^[19]

Muqtada continued to pursue his objectives carefully by restricting his movement’s participation in Iraqi governmental affairs, limiting their involvement to social ministries. Control of important social ministries, such as transportation and health, allowed Muqtada to obtain a wide array of resources with which he was free to reallocate to his supporters in the impoverished Shiite base.[20]

Lesson Three: Why did al-Sadr prefer to take control of service provision ministries rather than the Ministry of Defense, Foreign Affairs, or other ministries which might seem more powerful?

Muqtada’s strategy explicitly did not pursue more powerful ministries, such as Defense or Foreign Affairs.

Muqtada intentionally avoided major ministries and proceeded to let other political groups fight over them, thus completely circumventing problems that would arise in “…dealing with the coalition or [falling] short of unrealistic popular expectations.”^[21]

He pursued service-oriented ministries in order to strengthen his popular support: “[His] strategy is to rally the masses; that’s why he wants to dominate service-oriented civilian ministries through which he can gain greater popular support since most Iraqis consider services their number one priority.”^[22] Muqtada’s pursuit of public service ministries such as the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Heath also reflected his own organization’s deficiency of social, educational and health-related institutions. This important point stood in stark contrast to the services provided by other social groups in Iraq, as well as Hezbollah in Palestine, which Muqtada was attempting to imitate.^[23]

The ability to control civil-service ministries also entailed fringe benefits such as government permission to finance armed security personnel. As such, Muqtada was able to expand the reach of his Mahdi Army through their newfound abilities to use state vehicles and uniforms to carry out various missions.^[24]

Lesson Four: Did Muqtada al Sadr’s deputies become “kingmakers” in the new Iraqi government?

In line with his ever-evolving political strategy, Muqtada, who first distanced himself from participation with the new Iraqi government, decided to engage in the political process by formally participating in the 2005 elections: “In January 2005, Sadrists won 23 out of 275 parliamentary seats and performed well in local elections in Baghdad, Maysan and Basra. In December, they increased their representation to 32 seats, giving them quasi veto power within the dominant Shiite bloc over designation of the next government.”[25]

During negotiations over who would become Iraqi prime minister, Muqtada endorsed candidate Ibrahim al-Jaafari. With control of 35 of 275 seats in the Iraqi Parliament, Muqtada asserted his new political power and assumed the role of kingmaker.

His opposition to the candidacy of future Prime Ministure, Nuri al-Maliki, epitomizes Muqtada’s power and influence in the Iraqi parliament. In early 2006, Muqtada threatened civil war against Iraq’s Shiite population — implying that the ever-powerful Mahdi Army would be responsible for the fighting — if the next Prime Minister was Adel Abdul Mahdi and not Sadrist candidate Ibrahim al-Jaffari. Shockingly, al-Jaffari won the seat of Prime Minister in 2006, defeating Adel Abdul Mahdi by one vote.[26]

While the Sadrists eventually dropped al-Jaafari as their candidate for prime minister, Muqtada did so on the condition that future Prime Minister Maliki adhere to many Sadrists demands.[27]

Even as a representative of a marginal portion of the Shiite population, Muqtada has proven that he, the Sadrist bloc, and the Mahdi Army were indeed kingmakers. Not only did the Sadrists control a major voting bloc in Parliament, but the power, size, and reach of the Mahdi Army terrified top Iraqi officials with the threat of continued bloodshed in the war torn country.

Lesson Five: How has Sadr’s control of the Iraqi Parliament affect the policies the governing coalition would begin to pursue?

In late 2007, Muqtada al-Sadr announced that the Sadrist bloc would be leaving Iraq’s governing coalition on the basis that their “demands were not being met,” though observers pointedly note that the Sadrists “did not identify them.”[28]

With the loss of 30 coalition votes, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was left with less than half of the votes in parliament during his pursuits of new legislation. As such, Maliki was forced to attract the Parliamentary votes of minority parties and other independent groups.

The Sadrist bloc quit the coalition as legislation was being debated in parliament over oil revenue distribution. The bill would have allowed former Sunni officials involved with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime to re-enter the government, and even regain their old jobs.[29] This, however, was strongly opposed by Shiite groups that wholly reject the notion that former Sunni Ba’athists be allowed to reenter the post-Saddam political scene.[30]

While it could be argued that Maliki’s governing coalition bloc had the opportunity to pursue legislation that would have otherwise been stalled by the Sadrists, the loss of 30 votes undoubtedly made it harder to for Maliki to get key legislation passed, and for strenuous months it further weakened “the chances of reaching the political compromises needed to end the fighting between minority Sunnis and independent Shias.”[31]

Lesson Six: If Iraqi legislators moved from a parliamentary to a presidential system would it have decreased the power that Muqtada al-Sadr held in government?

If Iraq were to decide that moving from a parliamentary system, Muqtada’s Sadrist groups would undoubtedly lose favor and persuasion in the federal government, as they would be unable to hold sway as they do now in a parliamentary coalition.

Parliamentary systems tend to favor countries that are diverse in interests and ethnic composition. As such, Iraq finds a parliamentary system best to represent the different interests that the diverse Iraqi population represents.

In Parliamentary systems, government accountability is higher and voters are able to enforce some form of discipline upon their government.

However, parliamentary systems often allow the Prime Minister and cabinet to manipulate the legislature by offering intra-party perks and promotions. It is rare for one party to obtain enough seats in the Parliament to hold a majority, which forces different parties to form coalitions in order to obtain a majority vote. As seen with Iraq, these majority coalitions tend to be fragile: the Sadrist bloc quitting the governing coalition is a prime example of the fragility of majority coalitions in parliamentary systems.

The presidential system would have excluded Muqtada from his gradual role as a kingmaker in Iraq’s parliamentary system. His marginal support could not possibly obtain enough votes nationally to elect a Sadrist president. Another advantage to a presidential system in Iraq would have been that a president would be directly elected by the Iraqi people.

A system of separation of powers would help prevent different branches of government from abusing their given powers. The presidential system also allows for stability, as a president is not subject to coalition fragility or the prospect of being removed from power at any time.

However, in Iraq there seemed to be more disadvantages to a presidential system than advantages.

Iraq decided against a presidential system out of fear that it would be lead to Shiite political domination. Since voting in Iraq tends to be strictly upon ethnic and religious lines, it would be expected that the Shiite population — making up 60% of Iraq — would largely dominate in elections. Thus, the government composition would directly reflect the interests of the majority of Shiites, and would exclude Sunni and Kurdish interests.

Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi criticized the parliamentary system in Iraq after the 2007 elections. Allawi believed that because of party-based voting, a key component of parliamentary systems, “the vast majority of the electorate based their choices on sectarian and ethnic affiliations, not on genuine political platforms.”[32]

Lesson Synopsis and Conclusion

Lesson One: Even marginal, extremist militias that represent interest of a significant minority can operate autonomously and with deadly self-sufficiency.

Lesson Two: An invading force must immediately secure and control enemy infrastructure and retain order, lest a short-window power vacuum enables a minority to wreak havoc and destruction for years.

Lesson Three: Sacrificing control or failing to secure even marginal civil services, such as transportation and hospitals, can unduly embolden, strengthen, and expand the operating power of a small extremist militia.

Lesson Four: In a parliamentary system, a small minority group can become a “kingmaker” bloc and threaten or influence the election of its own prime minister.

Lesson Five: A kingmaker bloc can threaten — if not with violence than by outright leaving the parliamentary system — a ruling coalition to give too much consideration to legislation that is not representative of the developing government’s interests.

Lesson Six: While a Presidential system would neutralizing the threat of minority extremist groups like Muqtada al-Sadr’s, the Parliamentary system is more inclusive and sought to diffuse concerns between a once-powerful Sunni minority and a historically-oppressed Shiite majority.

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[1] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 13. [2] Ibid., 14.
[3] “Hezbollah Said to Help Shiite Army in Iraq,” New York Times, November 28 2006. [4] Ibid., 2.
[5] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 19.
[6] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 19 (footnote).
[7] “The Calm before the Storm,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb 2007, 20. [8] Ibid., 20. [9] Ibid., 21.
[10] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 19 (footnote).
[11] Ibid., 20. [12] Ibid., 19 (footnote). [13] Ibid., 19-20.
[14] International Crisis Group, “Sadrists & the Surge” July 11 2006, 2.
[15] “Mehdi fighters ‘trained by Hizbollah in Lebanon’,” The Independent, August 20 2007.
[16] International Crisis Group, “Sadrists & the Surge” July 11 2006, 10. [17] Ibid., 15. [18] Ibid., 16.
[19] “Trial Near for Shiite Ex-Officials in Sunni Killings,” New York Times, November 5 2007. [20] Ibid., 2.
[21] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 13.
[22] Crisis Group interview, Jaysh al-Mahdi commander, Baghdad, April 2006.
[23] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 14. [24] Ibid., 15.
[25] International Crisis Group, “Spoiler or Stabilizer?” July 11 2006, 14.
[26] “Radical Cleric Rising as Kingmaker in Iraqi Politics,” New York Times, February 16 2006.
[27] “Iraq at the mercy of ‘kingmaker’ Muqtada,” Asian Times Online, May 6 2006.
[28] “Shia bloc quits Iraq’s governing coalition,” CBC News, September 16 2007. [29] Ibid. [30] Ibid. [31] Ibid.
[32] “How Iraq’s Elections Set Back Democracy,” New York Times, November 2 2007.